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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CRAIG J. REECE, J 
Plaintiff-Appellant, ] 
vs. ' ] 
BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE STATE OF UTAH, ] 
and the UNIVERSITY OF UTAH, J 
Defendants-Respondents. ] 
I Case No. 19600 
REPLY BRIEF OF THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT 
NATURE OF TOE CASE 
This is an action for restitution and declaratory judgment that the 
respondents violated Mr. Reece!s right to procedural due process with their 
policies and procedures for increasing rent at student family housing at the 
University. Also, the practices of using rent to finance new construction and 
capital improvements on a cash basis violates substantive due process and 
equal protection of the laws. 
DISPOSITION OF TOE CASE BELOW 
Judge Sawaya, of the Third Judicial District Court, denied and struck the 
appellant's motions for partial summary judgment; and granted motions for 
summary judgment by each respondent. 
-1-
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant seeks an order reversing or vacating summary judgment for 
each respondent; an order granting each of the appellant's motions for partial 
summary judgment; a remand for trial on the issue of the amount of restitution 
to be paid to the appellant; and an order granting costs on appeal. In the 
alternative, appellant seeks reversal and remand for a trial on all issues, 
and his costs on appeal. 
THE FACTS OF THE CASE 
The facts of this case are set forth in sufficient detail in the 
Appellant's Brief and need not be repeated here. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE BOARD OF REGENTS DID NOT DELEGATE THE POWER TO SET RENT TO THE 
nsTSTITUTIONAL COUNCIL 
The respondents have asserted that the Board of Regents delegated the 
power to set rent to the Institutional Council of the University of Utah, and 
that Board approval of rent increases was therefore not necessary. In so 
doing, they make several factual assertions that are not in the record. The 
record shows that the Board passed a resolution directing the Commissioner of 
Higher Education to draft a proposed amendment to the Board housing policy to 
-2-
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the effect that the Board would not approve rent increases if a student 
housing facility was "self-supporting.ff (R.279). There is nothing in the 
record showing that the proposed rule was ever drafted. Tne respondents 
then go two steps beyond the record and assert that the proposed rule was 
passed in accordance with the requirements of the Administrative Rule-Making 
2 
Act. The agendas and minutes required by §63-46-12 would have proven 
whether the Act was complied with, but this documentation was not produced 
pursuant to request. (R.305). Thus, the record is devoid of any evidence 
that the proposed rule was drafted or lawfully promulgated. 
POINT II 
THE COST OF CAPITAL IMPROVEMENTS At© NEW CONSTRUCTION CANNOT BE 
DIRECTLY PASSED TO STUDENTS THROUGH RENT 
There is no dispute between the parties that the Board of Regents has 
authority to make capital improvements at the Village. The dispute is whether 
the respondents can use their rules to create new ways to finance capital 
improvements and new construction in a manner that is inequitable and 
discriminatory. The respondents have never argued that their rules are 
equitable or constitutional. The respondents have abused their authority by 
creating a perpetual construction fund for the benefit of future tenants and 
the University. 
This documentation was requested but never produced. (R.304). 
Respondents1 brief at 11. 
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The record does not show that the Board of Regents approved the new 
construction and capital improvements as required by §53-48-17. It is 
admitted these expenses were not approved by the Board. (R.361). Ihere is 
also nothing in the record showing that even the Institutional Council 
approved the $550,070 in capital improvements. To get around this hole in the 
record, the respondents argue that approval by the Board of Regents can be 
3 
"assumed." The notion of assumed approval is foreclosed by §53-48-5(8) 
(Supp. 1983): "All matters requiring board determination shall be presented to 
and deliberated upon by the board as a whole or as an executive committee of 
the board properly convened." 
The respondents claim that some of the administrative expenses for the 
entire university are operating and maintenance costs of the Village. 
There is nothing in the record showing any factual link between the activities 
of the Village and the University's police, fire, personnel, and public 
relations expenses. The repondents attempt to analogize these expenses to the 
property taxes a private landlord passes on to his tenants fails because: (1) 
the Village is exempt from taxation, so there are no taxes to pass through, 
§53-48-18, and (2) the university's administrative expenses are already paid 
by appropriations and general fees, so there is no net cost to pass through. 
The respondents do not have the taxing authority necessary to permit them to 
charge for governmental activities. 
Respondents1 Brief at 18. 
Respondents1 Brief at 19. 
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POINT III 
THE RENT INCREASES VIOLATED DUE PROCESS 
The respondents argue that Mr. Reece does not have a property interest in 
rent because he has a month-to-month lease that allegedly terminates and 
5 
renews with each passing month. There is substantial contrary authority 
holding that month-to-month leases are continuing rights of possession that do 
not end without an affirmative act of termination by one of the parties. 
Harryfs Village, Inc. v. Egg Harbor Township, 446 A.2d 862, 865 (N.J. 1982): 
Goler Metorpolitan Apartments, Inc. v. Williams, 260 S.E.2d 146, 149 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 1979), cert, denied, 265 S.E.2d 395 (N.C. 1980); Kennedy v. Kidd, 557 
P.2d 467, 470 (Okla. Ct. App. 1976); Rossow Oil Co. v. Heiman, 242 N.W.2d 176, 
180 (Wis. 1976); 49 Am. Jur. 2d Landlord and Tenant, §73 (1970). The Court 
need not necessarily decide between the competing authorities because (1) the 
lease in this case contains a written rent clause, and (2) the governmental 
nature of the student housing lease is of a different character than common 
law leases. 
It is undisputed that the respondents may charge rent only for utilities, 
bond debt, maintenance, and operating costs. This restriction is created by 
statute, §53-38-6, and section 1 of the lease. These express limitations on 
rent apply throughout the duration of the lease, whether by continuation or 
renewal. Accordingly, the renter in Pingree v. Continental Group of Utah, 
Inc., 558 P.2d 1317 (Utah 1976), successfully challenged a rent increase 
Respondents1 Brief at 21. 
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for a renewal term on the basis of a written rent escalator clause, even 
though the primary term had expired. Id. at 1321. The limitations on rent 
in the present lease therefore continue in force and apply to future as well 
as present rent. 
A lease for student family housing at a state university is not the 
typical month-to-month lease, but gives a continuing right of possession based 
on student status. Student housing serves a valuable governmental purpose by 
providing low cost housing to students, thus assisting low income persons to 
obtain a college education. The housing is intended to induce students to 
attend the University by providing economical living accomodations. (R.356). 
This, in turn, reduces the demand for limited student financial aid funds. 
The Board of Regents is directed to operate the housing "for the welfare of 
die institution and its students . . .,f Utah Code Ann. §53-38-3(7) (1981). 
The low cost feature of student housing is more fully discussed in Appellant's 
Brief, at 15-17. 
The student's right to live in the Village is based on maintaining his 
status as a student. As a contract based on continuing status, the student 
housing lease provides a general right of continuing occupancy for so long as 
6 The lease in Pingree was converted to a month-to-month lease and the rent 
increase was voided because the rent escalator clause was too vague and 
indefinite to be enforceable. The rent terms in the present lease would 
suffer the same fatal defect if the respondents1 definition of 
1
'maintenance and operating1 f expense is accepted. The respondents claim 
the right to define that term in any way they see fit by rejecting 
traditionally accepted definitions and limitations. Such an all-inclusive 
standard is no standard at all. Neither of the respondents have 
promulgated any rules defining allowable expenses to be charged to 
students. (R.360). See 1 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts §98 (1963). 
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the tenant maintains eligibility. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), 
as explained in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-77 (1972) (there 
was a property interest in continued receipt of welfare payments because of 
administrative and statutory eligibility standards). Given the special nature 
of a low cost housing lease with the government, a student has a continuing 
right of possession. See, Joy v. Daniels, 479 F.2d 1236 (4th Cir. 1973); 
Caulder v. Durham Housing Authority, 433 F.2d 998 (4th Cir. 1970), cert, 
denied, 401 U.S. 1003 (1971); Escalera v. New York City Housing Authority, 425 
F.2d 853 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 400 U.S. 853 (1970); Appel v. Beyer, 39 Cal. 
App. 3d Supp. 7, 114 Cal. Rptr. 336 (Cal. App. Dept. Super. Ct. 1974); Vinson 
v. Greenburgh Housing Authority, 288 N.Y.S.2d 159 (N.Y. App. Div. 1968), 
aff'd, 27 N.Y.2d 675, 262 N.E.2d 211, 314 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1970); Nashville Housing 
Authority v. Taylor, 442 S.W.2d 668 (Term. Ct. App. 1969). Since Mr. Reece 
had a continuing right of possession, he had a continuing property interest in 
the rent paid under the lease. 
The respondents next assert that notice need not be given because the rent 
increases do not affect Mr. Reecefs "personal" rights. It is hard to 
imagine rights more personal than those created by an individualized 
contract. Even though a large number of individuals are affected by one rent 
increase decision, due process still requires notice to each member of the 
class and an opportunity for representatives of the class to present their 
interests to the decisionmaker. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank k Trust Co., 
339 U.S. 306, 318-320 (1950). 
Respondents1 Brief at 23-24. 
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o 
Contrary to the respondents1 assertion, merely providing notice of the 
effective date of the rent increase does not satisfy due process. Laureano v. 
Koch, 454 N.Y.S.2d 956, 960-61 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982) (applying the New York 
state constitution). See also Memphis Light, Gas Sc Water Div. v. Craft, 436 
U.S. 1, 13-16 (1978). The fundamental requirement of due process is notice 
sufficient to "apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and 
afford them an opportunity to present their objections." Mullane, 339 U.S. at 
314 (emphasis added); Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 451 (1982). The 
respondents have confused the required notice of hearing with the notice of 
the effective date of the final decision. 
The record also does not support the respondents1 assertion that sixty 
9 days notice was given for the effective date of "each11 rent increase. Ihe 
dates and content of three of the notices are not in the record, although they 
were requested. (R.301-302). The affidavits by the respondents are too 
conclusory to support the contention that Mr. Reece had adequate notice of the 
alleged hearings. "Bare contentions, unsupported by any facts, do not resolve 
genuine issues of fact crucial to the resolution of the case.*' Frisbee v. K Sc 
K Construction Co., 676 P.2d 387, 390 (Utah 1984). 
The respondents have made the startling suggestion that the constitution 
should be suspended, in that student tenants should not be afforded due 
process but should be forced to move out of the Village. This position 
eviscerates the purpose of the Village to provide low cost housing to 
students. The respondents have taken the position that citizens cannot expect 
8 Respondents1 Brief at 23. 
9 Id. 
1 0
 Respondents' Brief at 21-22. 
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state officials to treat them with the fairness and justice required by the 
constitution. Instead, the respondents would put the burden on the aggrieved 
citizen to divorce himself from the control of the state by moving elsewhere. 
The due process clause was designed to prevent the governmental arrogance 
advocated by the respondents. 
POINT IV 
JUDGE SAWAYA DID NOT PROMISE TO TERMINATE DISCOVERY BY HIS MINUTE 
RULING 
The record does not contain any competent evidence that Judge Sawaya 
promised to end discovery during the hearing on August 8, 1983. The 
respondents cite to the transcript of a hearing held October 3, 1983, where 
trial counsel for the University of Utah related his unsubstantiated 
recollection of events that transpired on August 8th. Unverified and 
self-serving recollections of counsel do not gain substance through 
repetition. Since the August 8 hearing is not in the record, the Court should 
ignore the comments of counsel. Robinson & Wells, P.C. v* Warren, 669 P.2d 
844, 846 (Utah 1983). 
POINT V 
IT WAS ERROR TO REFUSE TO ALLOW THE APPELLANT TO HAVE DISCOVERY 
After the respondents filed their motions for summary judgment, Mr. Reece 
filed an affidavit explaining that the respondents had exclusive possession of 
Respondents1 Brief at 25. 
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evidence, and requested a continuance pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 56(f). 
(R.317, 314-15, 325). These materials were treated as a motion for a 
continuance by the respondents, so they are estopped to deny that such a 
12 
motion was filed. (R.330-31). 
In Cox v. Winters, No. 18690 (Utah, Feb. 9, 1984), this Court once again 
held that motions for continuance should be !'liberally11 granted when the 
nonmovant's discovery requests are unanswered and the moving party has 
exclusive possession of the evidence. Cox reaffirmed the holding in 
Auerbachs, Inc. v. Kimball, 572 P.2d 376 (Utah 1977), where a refusal to allow 
discovery was reversed under facts no more compelling than those in this case. 
The record shows, contrary to the respondents1 argument, that the 
13 discovery requests were timely filed. The respondents emphasize that the 
motion for continuance and discovery requests were filed after their motions 
14 for summary judgment were filed. A motion for continuance will always, by 
definition, be filed after the first movant has filed its motions. The 
evidence requested in the accompanying discovery requests merely shows that 
the motion for continuance was well taken. 
Each of the three months delay before the filing of the motion for 
continuance were caused by the respondents. The first month, including a two 
week extension, was the time it took the respondents to answer the Complaint. 
(R.16,24). The second month was the time allotted to the respondents to 
answer Mr. Reece's first motion for partial summary judgment. (R.26,73). The 
Respondents1 Brief at 27. 
13
 M. 
14
 Id-
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respondents never responded, but twice postponed the hearing set by Mr. Reece 
for a third month, at which time they filed their motions for summary 
judgment. (R.286,294). If there was any unreasonable delay in this case, it 
was caused by the respondents. 
Finally, the respondents are incorrect in stating that the public records 
sought in the request for the production of documents were readily available 
to Mr. Reece. Although the documents sought are public records, the 
University had a policy of refusing access to these records, in clear 
violation of the state public records laws. (R.354). Constructive possession 
of documents is no substitute for evidence in the record. 
Ckh 
Respectfully submitted this _jJ_ day of May, 1984. 
1 6
 Respondents1 Brief at 28. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on May ff , 1984, I hand-delivered four copies of this 
reply brief to Bill L. Walker and Douglas C. Richards, Assistant Attorneys 
General, at 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
W , 9 -£(%CiL 
/ / 
Craig J. Reece 
APPENDIX - NEWLY DISCOVERED CASE 
3h Kish v, Wright, 562 P.2d 625 (Utah 1977), this Court held that Utah 
State district courts have jurisdiction over actions brought under 42 U.S.C. 
§1983. The argument on this point in the Appellant's Brief, Appendix at A-3, 
is therefore surplussage. 
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